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CHAPTER 11
Brazil in the Era of Fascism: The “New State”
of Getúlio Vargas
António Costa Pinto
The Authoritarian ‘Reverse Wave’
of the Interwar Period in Latin America
In his review of the Oxford Handbook of Fascism (2009), edited by
Richard Bosworth, Roger Griffin stressed that it was ironic that the task
was given to an historian that “has in the past often expressed his irritation
with those concerned with ‘the history of fascism’ (or rather ‘compar-
ative fascist studies’) (…) In some respects, then, asking Bosworth to
be the Duce of OUP’s ambitious project is like asking a vegan restau-
rateur to head a team of cooks preparing a medieval banquet where spits
rotate slowly, laden with basted pigs and lambs”.1 In fact, and contrary
to Bosworth, as Roger Griffin demonstrates in is masterful The Nature
of Fascism (1996), Mussolini Dictatorship provided powerful institu-
tional and political inspiration for other regimes of the “Era of Fascism”.
Mussolini’ type of leadership, institutions and operating methods already
encapsulated the dominant models of the twentieth-century dictatorship
at least in three domains: personalised leadership, the single or domi-
nant party, and the ‘technico-consultative’ political institutions, based on
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corporatism.2 In this chapter in homage to Roger Griffin, I develop these
features looking at the case of Getulio Vargas’ Brazil.3
Latin America participated in what has been called the first wave
of democratisation, and in the subsequent ‘reverse wave’ that by 1942
had significantly reduced the number of democratic regimes in the
world.4 Regardless of the political regime classification adopted or the
different periodisation, by the early 1930s—and especially during the
Great Depression—there was ‘a surge of reactionary regimes (that)
reduced the proportion of competitive systems to a low of 19% in 1943’.5
Between 1930 and 1934, there were 13 successful coups, followed by
a further seven in the last years of the decade.6 During this time, an
impressive spectrum of authoritarian regimes was established, some of
which were very instable and poorly institutionalised, while others were
more consolidated. The “New State” of Getúlio Vargas in Brazil is a
paradigmatic case.
As has been noted several times, from both a comparative and transna-
tional perspective, the authoritarian ‘reverse wave’ of the interwar period
was a process that was ‘contaminated by mutual emulations that are
affirmed in their national development (but which are) part of the same
historical cycle’.7 In this chapter, we analyse the processes of institutional
reform in 1930s Brazil paying particular attention to how domestic polit-
ical actors rely on the ‘heuristics of availability’ in order to pursue similar
authoritarian changes while looking at institutional models of fascism and
corporatism for their own countries.8
Vargas’s ‘New State’
The New State established in Brazil by Getúlio Vargas (1937–1945) is
the most important case of the institutionalisation of corporatism in an
authoritarian setting in Latin America. While corporatist representation
was outlined in the 1937 Constitution, social corporatism had a durable
legacy and Vargas’s dictatorship represented a much more powerful break
with political liberalism than was the case with other contemporary
regimes in Latin America. On the other hand, in Brazil, the diffusion
of corporatism was more developed in conservative and fascist political
circles and movements and as a proposed reform of political representa-
tion within a liberal framework. In fact, from the beginning of the 1930s,
several important steps towards the institutionalisation of social corpo-
ratism had been taken, and the representation of interests institutionalised
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in the 1934 constitutional assembly and later consolidated with the New
State in 1937.
The 1930 Revolution opened the crisis of the old republic’s oligarchic
liberalism in Brazil and launched a complex political process marked
by a great deal of political instability prior to the 1937 coup.9 Mobil-
ising junior officers, the so-called tenentes, some high-ranking officials,
favouring a more centralised and efficient state by dismantling the clien-
telistic political structures of the old republic and its regional political
parties, the political forces that came to power with Getúlio Vargas
in November 1930 were more heterogeneous than was the case with
other similar processes in Latin America. Nevertheless, one of the main
promises of the provisional government was to call elections to a consti-
tutional assembly. Getúlio Vargas was already a well-established politician
during the old republic, before he became the main civilian leader of
the 1930 Revolution: he had been governor of Rio Grande do Sul,
a deputy, a minister, and was a presidential candidate in 1930 elec-
tion, standing against the nominated candidate of President Washington
Luis.10 If we can trace his ideological origins, the most important influ-
ence was probably the authoritarian positivism of Julio de Castilhos, the
all-powerful governor of his native state, Rio Grande do Sul, in the turn
of the century.11 With its vague authoritarian and anti-oligarchic party
programme, after taking power Vargas’s provisional government was in
no rush to establish a new constitutional order and instead almost imme-
diately set about strengthening central power through the appointment
of trusted interventores in each of the states. However, the Constitution-
alist Revolt of 1932, an insurrection led by the State of São Paulo that
demanded the restoration of the 1898 Liberal Constitution and which
was defeated by Vargas, caused him to call a constitutional assembly to
approve a new Constitution in 1934.
With an army strengthened by the conflict, he accepted the elections
but had strong reservations about the new Constitution that limited
his power and restricted his mandate to just one term. From 1934
to 1937, a number of crises were marked by political polarisation and
tensions that suggested either the reestablishment of the liberal order or
a strengthening of authoritarianism with the growing importance of two
extra-parliamentary radical political movements: the fascists of AIB and
the communist-supported National Liberation Alliance (ANL—Aliança
Nacional Libertadora).
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Following an attempted putsch led by ANL in November 1935, Vargas
declared a state of siege and ‘war on communism’, reinforcing his alliance
with the military leadership and civilian conservative forces, including the
Catholic Church. The repressive apparatus was dramatically extended,
with the banning, arrest, and purge of left-wing activists. When, after
several extensions of the state of emergency, the majority in Congress
called for it to end and, faced with his inability to stand for re-election
in 1938 and after some hesitations, Vargas and his associates decided
to act. Inventing a fake communist conspiracy, the ‘Cohen Plan’, and
with the support of the head of the army, Vargas decreed the New State
dictatorship on November 10, 1937.
Corporatism peaked with the New State, but its ideological and insti-
tutional presence had been a part of the official political discourse since
1930. At the start of 1931, Vargas was clear when he declared that
one of his goals was to ‘destroy the political oligarchs and to establish
representation by class rather than through the old system of individual
representation that was flawed as an expression of the popular will’.12
The adoption of corporatism was, therefore, a trademark of the 1930
Revolution that immediately shaped both the elections to the constitu-
tional assembly and the 1934 Constitution.13 Throughout the 1930s,
corporatism—which was associated with authoritarianism, centralism, and
nationalism—was assumed by several different emerging political forces,
ranging from fascists to social Catholics and ‘passing through several
tenentista and Getulista factions’. The political discourse in favour of
technical governments was also very powerful during this period.
Around 40 deputies to the 1933 constitutional assembly represented
professional interests, and debates between the different options for
corporatist representation were intense. With the 1934 Constitution,
corporatist representation became a fact at both federal and the regional
levels. The cleavage between the liberals and corporatists, and within
this latter group, was clear. The most polarising aspect of the debate
concerned the powers of the corporatist institutions (about whether they
were to be consultative or deliberative) and whether representation would
be through technical councils or in parliament. This latter option was
chosen, with Vargas’s support, for the constitutional assembly, against the
proposals that were supported by business groups in the Federation of
Industries of the State of São Paulo (FIESP—Federação das Indústrias
do Estado de São Paulo).14 Integral corporatist representation of the
type proposed by the AIB was always a minority view. While discussing
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the option for a bicameral parliament, the 1934 Constitution established
a mixed parliament, with the same number of professional and direct
elected representatives of the previous constitutional assembly.
Social corporatism was implemented with the establishment of the
Ministry of Labour, Industry, and Commerce (MTIC—Ministério do
Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio) in 1930, which was also known as the
‘ministry of revolution’.15 The eminent corporatist intellectual Oliveira
Viana was appointed legal adviser to the MTIC in 1932. Decree 19.700
of March 1931 gradually replaced independent trade unions with state-
controlled syndicates. At the same time, several measures, including the
eight-hour day, paid holidays, and many other benefits, were progressively
introduced. The 1934 Constitution restored some trade union indepen-
dence; however, with the declaration of the state of emergency in 1935,
they were once more subjected to the state’s corporatist intervention, later
fully institutionalised.
AIB was perhaps the most important fascist movement in Latin
America and like its European counterparts made corporatism part of
its political identity and plans for its future integral state.16 Founded in
1932 by Plínio Salgado, a politician and Catholic and modernist intellec-
tual, its main leaders included Miguel Reale and Gustavo Barroso. AIB
quickly grew into a national organisation and adopted the militia struc-
ture typical of fascist parties. Integral corporatism was supported by many
of the movement’s founders, including Olbiano de Melo and others, even
before they joined the AIB.17
AIB’s charismatic leader was influenced more by the Portuguese Inte-
gralism of António Sardinha (Integralismo Lusitano) and by Charles
Maurras than he was by the Italian Fascism. Nevertheless, the AIB’s
leadership was well aware of European versions of corporatism and its
theorists, especially as promoted in Italy and Portugal.18 Miguel Reale,
the AIB’s national secretary for doctrine, was influenced more by Italian
Fascism, even though he was less enthusiastic with its organic totality.19
The same could be said of Plínio Salgado, although this element of AIB’s
political programme was developed largely by Reale, who was the AIB’s
most structured corporatist ideologue. Reale’s model was for a political
representation project with the corporations the official bodies in which
members of the different professions would be represented. Each corpo-
ration would elect its representative to a national corporatist chamber,
which, with the Senate to which members of ‘non-economic’ (i.e. social
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and cultural) corporations would be sent, would form the bicameral
National Congress.20
Corporatism was an integral part of the AIB’s identity and of the asso-
ciation its leaders and followers made with European fascism. Plínio called
for a basic form of corporatism that was created through the organisation
of professions from the municipal to the national level and which rejected
state corporatism.21 Some years later, the integralist leader said he wanted
to place himself in the centre, midway between Reale’s fascism and Jeová
Mota’s leftist social corporatism.22
When Getúlio Vargas led the 1937 coup, he was supported by the
AIB, while Francisco Campos—the minister closest to fascism—was an
apparent intermediary; however, the AIB very quickly realised the new
regime was not going to give them the political space and integration
they desired. Although all other parties were banned, while the AIB
was allowed to continue as a think tank, tensions with the government
increased, leading—as in many other cases—to it also being banned and
some of its leaders, including Plínio Salgado, exiled, even as many others
joined the new regime. Following the AIB’s attack on the Guanabara
Palace in May 1938, they were persecuted by the New State.
Two intellectual politicians and close associates of Vargas, Francisco
Campos and Oliveira Viana, played decisive roles in the institutionali-
sation of corporatism during the 1930s. While he never held political
office, we could add to the list Manoilesco’s Brazilian translator, Azevedo
Amaral.23 These three were always present when referring to the relation-
ship between authoritarian intellectuals and Vargas’s New State.24 Their
influences were different, however. Campos was undoubtedly Vargas’s
main ideologist in the late 1930s, as well as serving as minister for educa-
tion and justice. He wrote the 1937 Constitution and many of Vargas’s
main proclamations during the early days of the New State. Oliveira Viana
had occupied a senior role within the Ministry of Labour since 1932 and
was one of the main authors of the corporatist labour legislation. Azevedo
Amaral remained an important publicist and author who was associated
with the regime’s propaganda apparatus, although he never held formal
political office.25
Francisco Campos was perhaps the New State’s most articulate ideo-
logical creator, since it was he who designed the new regime’s institutions
in the 1937 Constitution, that brought an end to the state of emergency
that had existed since 1935.26 Like Vargas, Campos was more attuned
to authoritarian positivism and less influenced in his youth by European
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Catholic and reactionary traditionalism.27 Author of a large selection
of political theory and law works, Campos began his political career in
traditional parties, and following the 1930 Revolution became a fellow
traveller with Getúlio Vargas, while at the same time moving towards
an elitist anti-parliamentary position. Later, he became the main ideo-
logue of the establishment of a personalised dictatorship endowed with
propaganda tools and mass organisations.28 Soon after the 1930 coup,
he and Gustavo Capanema organised the government-supported fascist-
style militia, the October Legion. He served as minister of education and
health in 1931 and in 1937 was appointed minister of justice. Campos was
the principal author of Vargas’s coup proclamation and stood in the back-
ground directing the dictator’s authoritarian discourse throughout the
regime’s early years as the New State was being institutionalised, although
many of its principals never got off the paper.29
Campos was a great legitimiser of an authoritarian state as the only
alternative to the ‘anachronism’ of liberal democratic institutions in a mass
society. He wrote:
The masses are fascinated by charismatic personalities. This is what is at the
heart of political integration. The larger and more active the masses, the
more political integration becomes possible only through the dictatorship
of a personal will. Dictatorship is the political regime of the masses. The
only natural expression of the will of the masses is the plebiscite: that is to
say, of acclamation and appeal before choice.30
Campos was also a supporter of social and political corporatism as the
main antidote to communism: as justice minister in 1940, he stated
that ‘Corporatism kills communism, just as capitalism generates commu-
nism’.31 As other intellectual politicians of the interwar period, Campos
used alternative concepts of democracy to legitimise the regime, but even
as he tried to situate his authoritarian projects midway between liberal
and totalitarian experiences, Campos stood closer to the latter than to
the former. The ‘exaltation of the leader, the break with democratic insti-
tutions and the dialogue with intellectuals who inspired fascism is very
clear’, to the extent that even supporters of the New State noticed.32 As
Vargas’s secretary was to write: ‘Let’s acknowledge that the accusation
[of fascism] was not a lie’.33 It was probably this association with fascism
that led Vargas to not reappointing Campos in the government when the
international winds changed direction in 1942.
242 A. C. PINTO
Oliveira Viana, one of Brazil’s leading intellectuals in the first half of
the twentieth century, served as legal adviser to the MTIC from 1932
to 1940.34 No examination of Brazilian authoritarianism or corporatism
can avoid Oliveira Viana, as he was the leading figure in the project of
instrumental authoritarianism—that is, presenting an authoritarian regime
as the means of overcoming the dilemmas of Brazil’s modernisation.35
Viana’s modernising approach was less present in other Latin American
corporatists: in fact, he ‘perceived himself, and was perceived by others,
to be a modern, scientific thinker – not a nostalgic reactionary’.36
Oliveira Viana’s corporatist project was the central element to legit-
imise the transformation of the state and to be the main bulwark for the
social peace that would get the country moving from top to bottom.37
His ‘authoritarian democracy [was] a democracy with authority, and not
liberty, as its essential principle’ and that it also should not have such polit-
ical institutions as a single party.38 ‘A sovereign president, who exerts his
power in the name of the nation, and is subordinate to and dependent
upon it alone’, ought to be enough, since parties were the vehicles of
the oligarchy: ‘the New State is not a single-party regime: it is a single-
president regime’.39 Aware that Vargas had banned parties—even though
they continued to exist at the municipal level—Viana thought it was ‘nec-
essary to abolish their component parts’, and that there was only one way
to achieve this—through the corporatisation of municipal representation
with the establishment of ‘obligatory professional representation in the
establishment of municipal councils’.40
To emphasise the instrumental and transitory nature of his authori-
tarianism, Viana differentiated his project from the Italian Fascist model,
stressing the technico-juridical nature of his approach and restating both
Manoilesco and the New Deal jurists, but all the while maintaining
the authoritarian model.41 In fact, while his legislative contribution was
largely restricted to social corporatism, as far as Viana was concerned,
‘the corporatist project and the strengthening of the presidential system
of government were the two touchstones of the new authoritarian democ-
racy’.42 A president, we must not forget, that Viana wanted to be elected
by a corporatist electoral college of political, administrative, professional,
and cultural institutions. While as a consultant to the Labour Ministry, he
was not the only author of the legislation shaping Brazilian social corpo-
ratism, he was its backbone and the leading Brazilian exponent of the
‘corporatist utopia of the good society’.43
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During the 1930s, the Brazilian Catholic Church redoubled its
struggle against communism. Ever since the 1930 Revolution, the
Church had followed and moved closer to Getúlio Vargas in an apparent
‘re-encounter with the state’.44 Catholic corporatism also followed this
dynamic, both in the Church’s independent activities and through its
collaboration with the Ministry of Labour, with which Catholic experts
had been involved since 1931 in drawing up corporatist legislation. The
press and intellectuals surrounding Catholic Action highlighted Euro-
pean models such as Salazar’s New State.45 Under the leadership of
Cardinal Sebastião Leme, who was archbishop of Rio de Janeiro from
1930 to 1942, the programme to ‘re-Christianize society’ was developed
as the reapproximation of the Church and state continued during the
1930s. The Constitution of 1934 re-established religious education in
public schools, provided public financial support for Catholic organisa-
tions, and secured a convergence between Catholic social corporatism and
the projects being promoted by Vargas.
The cardinal was considerably sympathetic to the fascist AIB, an organ-
isation in which many Catholic laymen, and even priests, held senior
political offices. In a confidential statement issued in September 1937,
Cardinal Leme stated ‘that it [Integralism] presently constitutes one of
the social forces best organised to defend God, nation and family against
atheistic communism’ and that its programme of social reforms ‘closely
follows the whole orientation of Catholic doctrine’.46 Leme came out in
support of the 1937 Coup, the leaders of which he said ‘Providence has
entrusted the destiny of Brazil’.47 He also spoke in favour of its agree-
ments with the New State, silencing voices that disagreed with the state
corporatism of Getúlio Vargas, which shared a similar dynamic with other
authoritarian experiments of the time.
The Constitution of 1937, which was written by the minister of justice,
Francisco Campos, was directly inspired by the Polish Constitution intro-
duced by Pilsudski in 1935, and which gave the president extensive
powers and legislative authority.48 Legislative power was formally exer-
cised by a parliament elected by an electoral college largely consisting
of members of the council of municipalities and the federal council that
replaced the Senate, consisting of representatives of the states and ten
presidential nominees.
The National Economy Council (CEN—Conselho da Economía
Nacional) collaborated with parliament. CEN was a consultative chamber,
consisting of five sections (Industry and Crafts, Agriculture, Commerce,
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Transport, and Credit) and made up of representatives of several branches
of national production, that was designed to promote the corporatist
organisation of the national economy. As a law professor and supporter of
Vargas wrote in 1937, in a clear reference to the Portuguese New State
Constitution of 1933, ‘The CEN will be our Corporate Chamber’.49 Its
members were elected by their respective associations, with ‘equal repre-
sentation for employees and employers’.50 All legislation affecting the
national economy had to be submitted to it for review, which also gave
it some legislative authority. Its members were chosen by an electoral
college made up of unions and employers organisations. The President
of the Republic was also elected by corporatist bodies (local authorities,
CEN, chamber of deputies, federal council).
There were extensive principles in the Constitution concerning the
corporatist foundations of national production that ensured the economy
of national labour would be organised in a corporation.51 Like other
authoritarian constitutions and labour codes of the 1930s, the inspira-
tion of Italian Labour Charter was evident, with Article 135 of the new
Constitution reproducing, almost word for word, Articles 7 and 9 of
the Italian charter.52 For Getúlio’s secretary and most observers at the
time, the most obvious aspect of its fascist inspiration was the ‘chapter
on economic organization based on corporatism’.53 In the New State
Constitution, the break with liberalism was much clearer than in other
dictatorships of the fascist era.
Although it wasn’t put to a plebiscite or implemented, the 1937
charter was the ideal-type regime reflected in the propaganda.54 In his
speeches, Vargas often spoke about the legitimacy of the new Constitution
as the foundation of the New State that had replaced political democracy
with economic democracy.55
The new Information and Propaganda Department (DIP—Departa-
mento de Informação e Propaganda) that was established in 1939 and
which reported directly to the President of the Republic coordinated the
creation of Vargas’s image as well as the regime’s censorship and cultural
policy. DIP, which was responsible for the systemisation of an ideal type of
state and society relations in the New State, had functions very similar to
those of its European peers, ranging from Italian Fascism to Salazar’s SPN
(Secretariado para a Propaganda Nacional). Just like them, DIP published
dozens of texts in which corporatism was presented as the official model
for the new regime, both at the elite and at the mass level.56
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The word chief also began to be used to define Vargas’s leadership,
especially during the 1 May celebrations, when Vargas was associated with
the new official unions and workers in general.57 New nationalist civic
ceremonies, such as the hour of independence and the youth parade, were
used to involve youth in the new regime, despite the failure to create the
national youth organisation Francisco Campos had proposed in 1938.58
These events, along with the other symbols of proximity to European
fascism, did not begin to disappear until after Brazil entered World War
II on the side of the Allies.59
The New State did not create a single or dominant party. Following
the AIB putsch of 1938, several New State strategists, including Francisco
Campos and his private secretary Luis Vergara, advised Vargas to create a
single party, which Vargas then sought to do. A series of meetings were
held to discuss creating a regime-supporting party that would be formed
around the powerful interventores in each of the states. It even had a
name: National Civic Legion (LCN—Legião Cívica Nacional). However,
there was also opposition to this proposal from among various members
of regional elites, and Vargas feared any new party could create a focus
for tensions that could weaken his hold on power.
In many official New State documents, the term ‘political’ was often
replaced by ‘administration’, praising ‘technicians as a counterpoint to
politics, which was described as the dirty side of private interests’.60 In
fact, bureaucratic-administrative centralisation was a trait of the dicta-
torship, and throughout the New State’s eight-year duration, Vargas
provided continuity both to the restructuring of the Brazilian state from
a more interventionist perspective and for economic nationalism. Several
important steps were also taken to promote political and administrative
centralisation under the authoritarian command of the National Chief.
One month after the coup, and with the support of the majority of
governors, and despite resistance and compromise, interventores became
the main actors in the political centralisation of state leaderships.61 Inter-
ventores had executive and legislative powers at the regional level that
transformed them into political coordinators who could ‘interlink New
State oligarchies, ministers and the President of the Republic’.62 From
April 1939, these interventores were made responsible to the administra-
tive departments that replaced elected state assemblies and were granted
the power to approve budgets and issue decree laws. The members
of these bodies were nominated by the president. Needless to say, the
party elites, while weakened, survived and ‘negotiated’ within these new
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structures at the regional level, in a process of partial continuity and
renewal.63
Another important feature of the New State administration was the
multiplication and overlapping of different bureaucratic-administrative
bodies that allowed the intervention of the federal government. Some of
these had been created during the 1930s, such as the technical councils,
institutes, and other federal agencies that became important instruments
of economic planning, coordination, and regulation.64 In the absence of
a single party and a corporatist or authoritarian parliament, these New
State governing bodies replaced the traditional representation channels to
become the focus for lobbying and the exertion of political pressure. As a
contemporary academic observer remarked, Brazil under Vargas became
‘Technically, a (non-party) full-fledged dictatorship’.65
As Vargas proclaimed in the 1938 May Day celebration,
I came to establish harmony and tranquillity between employees and their
employers […] However, harmony and tranquillity between employees and
employers is not enough. The collaboration of all in the spontaneous effort
and common labours are required for the good of this harmony.66
The new regime crowned the victory of social corporatism in an author-
itarian setting, and on May 1, 1943, after nearly a decade of social legis-
lation, the Consolidated Labour Laws (CLT), which finally systematised
and applied labour legislation in Brazil, were introduced.
In 1939, the trade unions became subordinate to the state, losing their
organisational independence. In 1940, Vargas established the minimum
wage and in 1941, the labour courts.67 Union funds were tightly
controlled and the imposto sindical (the compulsory union tax) was
created, the intention of which was to provide health and welfare benefits
for union members. Union leaders were vetted by the political police. As
in some other corporatist dictatorships, any kind of national confederation
of labour was banned. Unions were organised in industry-wide syndicates
which had a monopoly of representation within a tripartite system of
conciliation and arbitration that was largely modelled on Italian Fascist
legislation. State protection came under almost total union control,
which was opposed by many employers.68 Social Catholic organisations
feared this statist social corporatism while promoting a more pluralist and
societal approach. Industrialists reacted to this statist approach as well,
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although with Vargas being partially successful with their integration into
the new structures of social peace.69
One student of the Brazilian labour movement noted that the fascist
label ‘fails to capture the intellectual and legal origins of the social and
labour legislation that preceded 1937’.70 While the clearly authoritarian
and Catholic hand of Oliveira Viana drafted much of the labour legis-
lation, other contributors had also been present since the early 1930s.
In fact, Vianna stood alongside integralists, traditionalist Catholics, and
‘a widening array of lawyers [who were] drawn into the elaboration, re-
elaboration and administration of social and labour legislation’.71 This
was the case of many of the labour codes introduced by authoritarian
regimes in Europe and Latin America as well. As the ABC of political
analysis notes, similar structures may have very different functions across
political systems, and in the case of Vargas’s Brazil, corporatism left a
legacy of inclusion that ‘allowed a claim to citizenship and a legitimate
voice in public life’.72
Conclusion: The End of the ‘New State’?
From 1942, the New State’s authoritarian institutional innovation lost
its impetus. The international factor and the US’s Pan-American strategy
in Latin America also had a big impact on Brazil, so this new dynamic
could not have been strange. In the late 1930s, Vargas took a pragmatic
stance in his foreign policy, attempting to take advantage of the rivalry
between the great powers. After the 1937 coup, this position remained
unchanged.73 In 1938 though, Vargas distanced himself from the native
fascism represented by the AIB, repressed Nazi-inspired movements, and
declared the German ambassador persona non grata. Notwithstanding the
reservations of some segments of the army leadership, Brazil broke off
relations with the Axis and became the first Latin American country to
declare war on the Axis powers, and the only one sending troops to the
front in Europe.74 During the war years, Brazil got in turn 70 per cent
of all US aid given to Latin America.75
In 1943, Vargas began to suggest that there would, eventually, be a
move towards democratisation just as he, rather ironically, began organ-
ising a top-down party ahead of elections.76 Vargas’s social corporatism
sought to create an apolitical labour movement consisting of unions that
would function as consultative organs of government, with a model of
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class harmony and collaboration, but from 1943, when Vargas was antic-
ipating a process of regime change, he started to make a direct appeal to
the working class.77 In 1944, Minister of Labour, Alexandre Marcondes
Filho, called for a plebiscite that was never carried out, proposing a ‘semi-
corporatist’ state, with a CEN complementing, rather than replacing,
the legislature.78 The regime began to recognise and accept the polit-
ical and electoral potential of organised labour, and Vargas strengthened
his links with the working class, allowing union elections and even toler-
ating strikes, which, under the labour law, were illegal. Trabalhismo and
the ‘populist’ Vargas were in the making.79 The military, afraid of this
dynamic, overthrew Vargas in 1945, but many of the legacies of the
Estado Novo survived and even the ‘Father of the Poor’ would come
back in the 1950s.
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